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Abstract
Critical infrastructures – such as electricity networks, power stations and Smart
Grids – are increasingly monitored and controlled by computing and
communication technologies. The need to address security and protection of
electricity infrastructures with a high priority has broadly been recognized. This is
driven by many factors, including the rapid evolution of threats and consistent
technological advancements of malicious actors as well as potentially catastrophic
consequences of disruptions of such systems. Surveillance and security
technologies are traditionally used in these contexts as a protection mechanism
that maintains situational awareness and provides appropriate alerts. Surveillance
is a cumbersome process because of the need to monitor a diverse set of objects,
but it is absolutely essential to detect promptly the occurrence of adverse events
or conditions. The aims of this paper are twofold: First, we describe two
surveillance architectures in which different technologies can be used jointly for
boosting the safety and security of electricity utilities and other key resources and
critical infrastructures. Second, we review the typical surveillance and security
technologies and evaluate them in the context of critical infrastructures, which
may help in making recommendations and improvements for the future. To
accomplish these aims, we extracted and consolidated information from major
survey papers. This led to identifying the surveillance and security technologies,
their application areas, and challenges that they face. We also investigate the
perceived performance of the identified technologies in critical infrastructures.
The latter comes from interviewing experts who operate in critical
infrastructures, and thus provide indications for protecting critical infrastructures,
not least because of their increasing use of cyber-physical elements.
Keywords: Critical infrastructures protection; cyber-physical systems; privacy;
resilience; security; surveillance; utility networks
Introduction
Electricity utilities represent one of the essential (critical) infrastructures of our
modern society. Almost all aspects of our modern life (e.g., communication, trans-
portation, food, health-care) depend heavily on a reliable supply of electricity. Over
the course of the last few decades, these systems have become increasingly complex,
large, and interconnected. This development has been mainly driven by a variety of
economic, regulatory, social, and operational factors. Operationally, the geograph-
ical expansion and the extensive interconnection of electric power distribution can
play a key role in maintaining the reliability of these systems. Their ability to with-
stand unforeseen disturbances can be boosted by aggregating complementary loads
and hence effectively having supply and demand in balance. Electricity systems
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reliability is further improved by combining a large number of generation units
and pooling their power reserves to collectively overcome failures and sudden out-
ages. They are, therefore, characterized as a large-scale complex system-of-systems
that encompasses basically three phases: power generation (bulk power generators,
renewable energy sources), power delivery (high-voltage transmission as well as
medium and low-voltage distribution), and power demand (the electrical loads).
Holistic (or even subsystem-specific) control and monitoring functions, which are
facilitated by the various technological advancements, play a pivotal role in the
development of electricity utilities. These technologies include – to mention but a
few – flexible AC transmission systems (FACTS) controllers, phasor measurement
units (PMU), and advanced metering infrastructures (AMI).
While productivity, availability, quality of supply, cost, and reliability have been
considered with a higher priority when designing and operating traditional electric-
ity utilities, security and protection issues of such systems are increasingly demand-
ing a careful attention. Cyber and physical security aim at enhancing the ability
of power systems to withstand the different threats facing their assets including
their data, processes, components and subsystems. These threats include, but not
limited to, natural disasters, technological disasters due to human errors, deliberate
or non-deliberate attacks, and terrorism. For example, in 2013, a sniper attack at
PG&E Corp.’s Metcalf transmission substation knocked out 17 giant transformers
and the workers struggled for 27 days to recover [1]. Due to the extensive adoption of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in electric power system’s op-
erations, they are not only vulnerable to physical attacks but also to cyber-attacks
that were previously only common in IT security. The cyber-physical nature of
power systems opens the door for potential attackers to cause a serious physical
damage from a remote location and without any physical presence in the target
facility. In December 2015, external cyber-attackers launched a synchronized and
coordinated cyber-attack on Ukrainian power companies and other organisations in
variety of critical infrastructure sectors. The attack caused massive power outages
impacting a large customer base in Ukraine [2]. Given the enormous scale of power
systems and interdependencies with other critical infrastructures [3] has identified
three basic security threats relevant to electricity infrastructures: (i) Attacks upon
the power system targeting components of the power system and aiming at causing
damage and loss to the victim power system in the first place. (ii) Attacks by the
power system targeting the population by leveraging the power system’s parts as a
weapon (iii) Attacks through the power system targeting the other interconnected
utility network exploiting the risk of cascading failures to cross the boundaries of
interconnected infrastructures.
Therefore, the complex nature of electricity utilities and the increased rate of col-
laboration and interconnection renders the traditional security solutions ineffective.
As a result, the assumption that the inside doesn’t have risk sources and it is subse-
quently equipped with less protection is no more valid. On the contrary, it is highly
important to maintain situational awareness even within the system boundaries so
that the potential attackers can still be detected, and the security managers are
able to respond proactively. Observation and monitoring activities of the various
power systems’ processes and subsystems are a key source of information required
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for the situational awareness process in place. This process aims at understanding
the current security posture of the system and further predicting future states to-
wards getting ahead of potential attackers. The wide range of security technologies
and sensors allow the monitoring of human activities as well as physical and digital
assets and processes. Monitoring is an initial and crucial part of obtaining, fus-
ing, and processing data needed for issuing immediate alarms and making informed
decisions. Therefore, having dynamic surveillance systems will definitely improve
the situational awareness and hence boosting the security posture of the power sys-
tems [4]. Generally speaking, security has been characterised as the dominant driver
with regards to the development and deployment of surveillance solutions [5]. While
our main interest is in smart grid and power facilities, the results on surveillance
technologies we are presenting are generic enough to be applicable to critical infras-
tructures in general. Therefore, we do not talk explicitly about electricity systems
in the subsequent sections of the paper.
The role of surveillance
Surveillance is mostly concerned with the monitoring, in a systematic way, of the
actions or communications of one or more individuals. The collection of information
with regard to individuals, their activities, or their associates is its main purpose.
Another potential intention of surveillance may be to deter a whole population from
undertaking some kinds of activity [6]. Currently, and traditionally, a broad range of
surveillance technologies is used, across a very wide variety of scenarios [7, 8]. How-
ever, in this paper we are mostly interested in examining surveillance and security in
the context of power grids and critical infrastructures (CIs) that are monitored and
controlled by computing and communication technologies. Monitoring approaches
are mainly used for the detection of events or actions that deviate from normal be-
haviour, thus, rendering surveillance an enabler for protecting systems. As argued
in [9, 10], the protection of CIs is essential for the orderly functioning of a society,
its economy and national sovereignty. Now, more than ever, critical infrastructures
are facing an increase in the number and severity of threats [9, 11], and thus we
require security systems to operate as a protective means towards the detection of
actions that could result in catastrophe.
During the past few decades, security technologies have taken a significant leap
forward through rapid and continuous advances in science and technologies, which
have indeed played an enabling role in the process of developing security to go be-
yond its traditional practices, such as keeping watch over physical entities using
Closed-Circuit TeleVision (CCTV) cameras, to become pervasive systems that can
monitor almost all activities and transactions in both physical and cyber worlds.
Before the era of the Internet, security systems tended to prevent or warn of physical
trespass, harm, natural disasters or criminal actions. They are still applied in public
areas, train stations, airports, stadiums, banks, and the military as well as high-
security facilities and much more. Traditionally, we have deployed security solutions,
such as CCTV, access control and other systems, to achieve physical security func-
tionalities. Nowadays, cyber-attacks are increasing in number and severity. Hence,
intruders need no longer trespass into facilities by using excessive, or any, physical
force. Instead, they can use the Internet to gain access to companies, governmental
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and public agencies, and so on. Critical data can be stolen or even manipulated.
Specifically, cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures have the potential for a
widespread impact on almost all sectors of our societies, and therefore terrorist
organisations have shown an increasing interest in this kind of warfare. Conven-
tional protection systems were not designed to counter cyber-attacks; therefore,
new mechanisms have emerged, such as ‘dataveillance’, to prevent fraud, monitor
activities of these sorts of attackers, etc. Concisely, security, in terms of physical
and cyber manifestations, represents an integrated solution for protecting cyber-
physical systems by incorporating a wide variety of technologies for perimeter or
boundary monitoring, observing of human activities, and monitoring of control and
operational processes. These technologies can function synergistically to overcome
the limitations of each individual technology and consequently allow correlation
of inputs from multiple technologies to enhance safety, security, and operational
efficiency, simultaneously.
Nevertheless, despite the evolution of surveillance and security technologies and
their advancements, there are no solutions, to the best of our knowledge, which are in
a position to combine and match risk metrics, i.e., interconnected metrics stemming
from both physical and cyber environments. Such metrics could eventually be used
by computer-based surveillance solutions to keep critical infrastructures resilient.
We have defined ‘resilience’ in [12] as the ability of a system or network to provide
and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of various faults and challenges
to normal operation. This definition resulted from research conducted in the EU
ResumeNet project [13]. The use of such technologies in the context of a resilience
strategy [14] may provide significant information in order to promptly detect the
occurrence of adverse events or conditions [15] in a critical infrastructure.
Our motivation to investigate the state of the art in surveillance and security
technologies stems from our intent on developing innovative systems for protect-
ing critical infrastructures and improving their resilience. The aim is to compile an
overview of current technological trends and practices, as well as evaluating them
in order to identify potential gaps in technologies or ways of improving them. Al-
though several taxonomies exist [16], a compact yet functional list of technologies
that will facilitate their evaluation in the context of critical infrastructures is not
evident. We anticipate that fulfilling the above mentioned aim would facilitate the
interaction amongst relevant communities, e.g., critical infrastructure operators and
end-users, suppliers of security products, services policy makers and research organ-
isations [17], and encourage the development of innovative systems for protecting
critical infrastructures [18].
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the next section introduces
surveillance architectures used in critical infrastructures, electricity, power stations
and Smart Grids. Subsequently, we provide the results of a systematic literature
review on security technologies applicable in surveillance architectures and a com-
parative evaluation of the main categories. The evaluation results represent the
perception of experts with regards to security technologies currently implemented
in their organisation. Finally, we discuss our findings and provide concluding re-
marks, then indicate potential future directions.
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Surveillance architectures
In this section, we introduce and describe surveillance architectures employed in
critical infrastructures, specifically in utility networks, such as electricity. This in-
formation is obtained from discussions with engineers with expertise in the underly-
ing architectures and surveillance technologies used in utility networks. We consider
this to be expert knowledge – and applicable in the majority of electricity utility
networks.
Based on the Purdue model in [19], we identify two main different areas of utility
networks in which surveillance technologies can be applied. Specifically, these are
the enterprise zone (top layers of the Purdue model) and manufacturing zone (bot-
tom layers of the Purdue model). Concerning the enterprise zone, we assume the
existence of surveillance technologies/architectures that are applicable and similar
to the majority of technologies/architectures used in enterprise environments. The
biggest interest for us is the manufacturing zone, which differs in several ways from
the top layers of the infrastructure. In the remainder of this section, we describe
in more detail two main surveillance architectures applicable in utility networks. In
this paper, we correlate the size of field sites with the number of people being served
by the utility provider. We also note that the types of surveillance technologies and
architectures are highly dependent on the criticality of the processes taking place
on a field site, i.e. we assume that simple surveillance architectures are best suited
for field sites with low criticality, and more advanced architectures will be required
for field sites performing highly critical processes.
Simple surveillance architectures
In this section, we provide a generic surveillance approach that may be applicable
in small and/or low criticality field sites. In such cases, a suitably generic archi-
tecture of the surveillance system is illustrated in Figure 1. In this architecture,
we have three main points of concern. The first consists of field sites that are un-
der protection; second, we have the main offices of the utility network in which
a supervisory system is located; and finally, there may be a third-party company
which is in position to provide assistance in case of an alarm. In the following, we
provide a comprehensive description of the operations that can occur in this sort of
surveillance architecture.
One of the most basic component types in field sites is that of sensors. Depending
on the set of equipment installed on the field site and the level of awareness that
a utility provider needs to have, various types of sensors can be installed. In sim-
ple setups, sensors are mostly in position to provide bitwise information. Bitwise
information is required in order to identify changes in the status of an object. An
example would be the installation of binary sensors on fence gates, cabinet doors,
etc., in order to check if these are open or closed. In case someone enters the field
site via a fence gate, this would result in triggering the attached sensors. Other cases
would include the installation of motion detection sensors to detect intruders on the
field or the removal and/or alteration of field site devices. In a similar way, motion
detection sensors trigger analogous alarms. In all cases, this information is conveyed
to a local security box or in the absence of it, directly to a Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU) located onsite. RTUs, also sometimes called Remote Telemetry Units [20],
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are devices that are able to communicate with field site devices and the supervi-
sory system (Master Terminal Unit) located within the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ)
through a variety of communication systems (Radio, DSL, Satellite, etc.) [21]. The
data received from local field site devices is interpreted by the RTU and then con-
veyed to the supervisory system, where human operators are in position to review
the events that happen. Nevertheless, due to RTUs physical restrictions, e.g. a small
number of input/output slots, it is required in many cases to have set in place a
local security box. The latter is usually a device that is able to aggregate all the
information provided by various sensors of a field site. Thus, it is able to keep track
of all connected sensors, and therefore, to provide information about their status.
In case of a breach, the security box is informed by the individual sensor and it
subsequently sends a signal to the RTU. The latter then forwards a signal to the
supervisory system in order to alert the human operators that something requires
their attention.
After receiving the signal from the RTU, the human operators are in position to
open a remote session with the security box (e.g., instantiate a connection using
IP-based protocols). The operators, when connecting with the security box, are able
to get specific information about the status of all connected sensors, and thus to
further investigate the problem. An additional telephone connection between the
main offices and the security box onsite provides the functionality to perform calls
to the security box, which is usually equipped with microphones, thus allowing the
operators to receive further audio information about the status of the remote point
for increased situational awareness (e.g., hearing ambient noise). After sorting out
the potential problem (e.g., people sent to the field site to check the situation) sen-
sors are restored to their initial state. It is worth mentioning that in many cases an
external third-party company that provides monitoring/surveillance services might
be put in place. In the presence of this additional actor, the field site (i.e., the secu-
rity box) is usually passively monitored by the third-party. Specifically, in the case
of an alarm, operators of the utility provider should acknowledge within the system
that they are aware of it. Since third-party providers monitor the infrastructure in
parallel, they can identify whether the utility provider has acknowledged the alarm.
In the absence of an acknowledgement, third-party providers can act on behalf of
the utility operators and subsequently inform them about the incident.
Figure 1 Simple surveillance architecture for utility networks.
Advanced surveillance architectures
Although the architecture presented in the previous section consist of a simple and
inexpensive solution for typical small-scale field sites, it fails to scale up and to cope
with larger field sites where highly critical processes are in place. In order to sup-
port these large field sites, with a greater number and variety of sensors as well as
higher criticality, this requires a more advanced set of software and hardware solu-
tions. Usually, third-party companies provide such solutions by providing integrated
systems for controlling and monitoring the underlying critical infrastructure.
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In general, these advanced settings are capable of integrating information from a
wide range of sensors, including cameras, points of access control, field site perime-
ter, etc. All information stemming from the individual sensors in a field site is
collected on a local data server (see Figure 2). Thus, local client systems are able to
access this information and receive a wide range of indications. These systems typ-
ically provide a suitable graphical user interface to facilitate the process of getting
notified by alarms and to help operators to identify root causes of problems.
In the presence of an incident, the local data server logs an alarm triggered by
one or more of the sensors. This information is subsequently conveyed to the local
client system. The latter provides visual warnings to human operators (e.g., building
identification through blinking) to highlight the alarm via a sophisticated graphical
user interface. This consist of level one map in a series of three. In turn, operators
are able to further zoom in to the area/building by agreeing to investigate the
triggered alarm. The last phase includes further zooming in to the building and
getting fine-grained information about the place of the incident (e.g., floor and/or
room). Operations and functionality provided at this level of interaction with the
graphical user interface include access to remote devices as cameras for a live view
of the area, etc.
This is a process that can be replicated in all individual field sites of a utility
provider. Hence, in case of large service providers, this information can be further
scaled up via having a central office where an overall status view of all connected field
sites is provided (e.g., country level map). Thus, in this case, alarms are conveyed
from various local data servers to the main by attaching also the functionality to
zoom in to individual alarms remotely.
Figure 2 Advanced surveillance architecture for utility networks.
Surveillance and security technologies
In this section, we list surveillance and security technologies as identified in the
existing literature and may be applicable in surveillance architectures as the ones
described in the ’Surveillance architectures’ Section. The retrieval of technologies
was carried out from manuscripts that were obtained from several on-line electronic
databases. Specifically, to cover the majority of existing technologies, information
was retrieved from major survey papers. The examination of collected material re-
sulted in the identification of six main types of technologies based on their offered
functionality. Although a strict categorisation may be cumbersome – many tech-
nologies can be partially used in more than one area for the implemented devices to
provide the desired level of functionality – we have identified the following main
types, viz. biometrics, dataveillance, visual surveillance, communication surveil-
lance, location tracking, and ubiquitous surveillance. The individual technologies
and techniques within each of the categories listed in Table 1 may offer a different
functionality (e.g., identification, detection, verification) to fulfil different security
requirements (e.g., access control, cyber security, perimeter protection [16].
In addition to the list of identified technologies, we include in Table 2 a series of
sensors and transducers that could operate in more than one of the technologies
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identified in Table 1. The reason for separating the set of sensors/transducers from
the list of technologies is that the former can be used by a variety of surveillance
and security technologies. The sole application of any sensor/transducer does not
result in having a surveillance or security technology on its own.
In the following, we provide brief details about the identified types of surveil-
lance and security technologies; of course, more information concerning each of the
technologies can be retrieved from the individual documents.
Table 1 List of surveillance and security technologies.
Type Technologies Examples of techniques or devices per
technology
Visual surveillance Video Smart CCTV
[22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 7] Imaging scanner Infrared scanners, sonar imaging, ther-
mal imaging, x-ray imaging, radiation
imaging
Photography Cameras, mobile phones, mobile video
UAVs Drones, balloons
Biometrics Physiological Face recognition, facial thermograph,
fingerprint recognition, retina scanning
[22, 23, 25, 29, 30] Behavioural Infrared scanners, sonar imaging, ther-
mal imaging, x-ray imaging, radiation
imaging
Multimodal biometrics Multiple biometrics, multi-algorithm
systems, multi-sensor systems
Communication surveillance Cyber security Voice over IP, mobile phones, call log-
ging
[22, 23, 24] Physical Wiretapping
Location tracking Proximity sensing Proximity sensors
[22, 23, 24, 7] Scene analysis Image recognition algorithms
Triangulation Triangulation algorithms
Dataveillance Cyber security Intrusion detection and prevention sys-
tems, anti-malware, deep packet inspec-
tion
[22, 23, 29, 31] Data analysis Data mining and profiling
Triangulation Triangulation algorithms
Ubiquitous surveillance Embedded sensors Wearable digital media
[7, 32]
Table 2 List of sensors/transducers.
Sensors/Transducers [22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 34]
Audio and acoustic sensors
Binary sensors
Explosives detector
Radio frequency identification (RFID)









Technologies: Visual surveillance includes a very wide variety of technologies. The
main technology categories identified in the examined literature include those of
video, imaging scanners, photography and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Vi-
sual surveillance is mentioned in [35] to equate with the supervision, close obser-
vation, and invigilation of individuals who are not trusted to work or go about
unwatched.
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Application areas: Visual surveillance systems are closely coupled ‘with the con-
cept of territorial privacy; that is, the fact that our assumption of privacy varies
with place’ [36]. When it involves people or vehicles, surveillance applications may
be used for ‘access control in special areas; person-specific identification in cer-
tain scenes; crowd flux statistics and congestion analysis; anomaly detection and
alarming; and, interactive surveillance using multiple cameras’ [37, 38]. Therefore,
application areas for video surveillance could be the protection of private prop-
erties/workplaces (e.g., employee monitoring), border or perimeter control, public
spaces (e.g., banks, schools, transport systems, etc.), monitoring for criminal and
anti-social behaviour etc. Similarly, photography technologies are applicable in ar-
eas such as the identification and monitoring of both public and private spaces
(e.g., surveillance of suspects or known criminals, passport holders and car drivers
by the police, filming accidents etc.) [24]. In turn, UAVs (drones) are mostly used
in military operations, policing, border or perimeter control, emergency response
and monitoring for environmental hazards.
Challenges: Visual surveillance deals with various challenges including those of
privacy centric challenges [29], technical issues (e.g., systems integration), and/or
related to algorithmic problems (e.g., 3-D tracking, behavioural understanding) [37].
In addition, in some cases the operating environment of a device (e.g., level of light
and ambient conditions), or even the positioning of it [29] could be a significant
challenge.
Biometrics
Technologies: Biometric technologies refer to automated methods that are able to
identify or recognise the identity of a living person, after analysing some of his/her
characteristics (e.g., physiological and/or behavioural characteristics) [39, 40]. Ex-
amples of biometric technologies that consider the physiological characteristics of a
person are these of face recognition, facial thermogram, recognition of fingerprints,
the geometry of hands, iris or retina scanning, etc. In addition, behavioural ori-
ented biometric technologies include those that can recognise someone’s manner of
walking (i.e., gait recognition), analyse the way people type using a keyboard (i.e.,
keystroke analysis), how they operate a pointing device (e.g., mouse dynamics in
the case of a mouse), signature analysis, or even performing a waveform analysis
of people’s voices to verify their identity. Finally, another category of biometrics is
that of multimodal biometric systems, which refer to systems that include multiple
sources in order to establish the identity of an individual [41].
Application areas: The main objective of biometric technologies is to identify, ver-
ify, or authorise an individual. That objective is mainly accomplished through the
application of pattern-matching algorithms on a set of collected data (usually kept
in database systems). Therefore, some of the domains in which biometric technolo-
gies find a use are systems applicable to immigration and border control (e.g., use of
biometric ‘chipped’ passports [42]); to criminal justice systems and profiling systems
(e.g., the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) [43] used by the FBI and U.S. De-
partment of Justice); national identity systems, etc. [23]. Despite the wide spectrum
of applications of biometric technologies, their capabilities are mostly restricted to
the monitoring of people through identification or verification operations.
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Challenges: Despite the high effectiveness of biometric technologies, there are
recognised challenges that should be considered when using them. In most of the
examined studies, security and privacy concerns are identified as key challenges.
Another interesting challenge is that of the reliability level offered by biometric
technologies (e.g., reliability with regard to DNA comparison), or even vulnerabili-
ties that might exist in a system operating with biometric technologies [44].
Communication surveillance
Technologies: Communication surveillance can be defined as the ‘monitoring, inter-
ception, collection, preservation and retention of information that has been commu-
nicated, relayed or generated over communication networks to a group of recipients
by a third party’ [1]. When compared with dataveillance, communication surveil-
lance is mostly about voice call surveillance.
Application areas: This sort of technology has a level of ambiguity, connected
with the reason for using it, e.g., the use of communication surveillance to protect
nations against terrorism. On the contrary, since such technology is strongly linked
with the notion of electronic eavesdropping it could be perceived as a tool for
conducting espionage [45].
Challenges: Representative challenges in communication surveillance include how
to overcome the issues of human rights violation to privacy and freedom of expres-
sion. It is worth noting that despite the fact that all security technologies infringe
individuals’ privacy, in the case of communications surveillance the breadth and
depth of privacy infringement is usually difficult to foresee [45, 46].
Location tracking
Technologies: The main set of technologies used to perform tracking of locations
could be summarised into three main categories, viz. proximity sensing, scene anal-
ysis, and triangulation [23, 47]. Proximity sensing refers to the ability of a sensor
to identify if it is near to an object, and/or to be able to measure that distance
(depending on the complexity of the sensor)[2]. Scene analysis refers to systems that
are able to infer an entity’s/object’s position from a neighbouring relation (e.g., via
the use image recognition algorithms) [23]. Finally, triangulation is a method for the
determination of an entity’s/object’s location or distance to a point by measuring
two fixed angles [3].
Application areas: Location tracking has a broad range of application areas includ-
ing global positioning systems (GPS) for the determination of an entity/object, and
determination of the spatial dimensions and geometry of objects. Such technologies
appear to be useful in military operations, espionage or policing.
Challenges: The main value of location tracking technologies could also be one of
its biggest concerns as well. The potential to leak some information about a person’s
location, if this is not desirable, may lead eventually to privacy infringement. Along
with privacy issues, other types of challenge are technical ones, e.g., assuming a
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to ‘jointly satisfy the privacy objective of the surveilled while preserving the image
dissemination objective of the surveiller’ as described in [36].
Dataveillance
Technologies: In [6] Clarke defines dataveillance as the ‘systematic use of personal
data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications
of one or more persons’. As stated in [23], the term dataveillance usually appears
in the literature as the trend of applying security practices on personal data, and
regulates or governs people’s behaviour [48]. Such security practices may include
electronic processing of data, which will eventually result in providing an adequate
level of security. Technologies used in dataveillance systems include those of intru-
sion detection, prevention and deep-packet inspection systems [49] for cyber secu-
rity. There are also cases where honeypot, honey-spam and anti-malware systems
are set in place, usually having a defensive character. Additionally, data analysis
makes use of several technologies, namely data integration (e.g., data marts and
data warehouses) [50, 51], virtual machine introspection [52], and database and
data retention systems. The latter refer to the definition of a set of policies on
persistence and management of data for meeting specific legal and business data
archival requirements [4].
Application areas: One important application area for dataveillance technologies
is their use by security agencies and bodies to perform pattern recognition and pre-
dictions [23]. Such approaches usually depend on the use of data-mining techniques.
Other technologies used in data processing techniques include pattern recognition
and prediction. Dataveillance technologies could be also used by employers to mon-
itor employees (monitoring of calls, e-mails, or even computer keystrokes); used in
targeted environments or even mass surveillance (e.g., profiling via data mining);
apply deep packet analysis to detect, block and protect against security threats,
enforce parental control; or even to prevent exfiltration of private or classified in-
formation.
Challenges: The key challenges in dataveillance vary from technological [53] to
legislation [54] (e.g., privacy issues). More specific examples with regard to techno-
logical challenges, and mostly related to cyber security and deep packet inspection,
include capturing and processing of packets in multi-gigabit links without any packet
loss; the existence of a large number of application signatures and their complexity;
and the potential unpredictability imposed by network flows or packet payloads with
regard to their signatures, which could eventually lead to a degraded performance
of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) services [55].
Ubiquitous surveillance
Technologies: Ubiquitous surveillance are related to the unilateral gathering of data
on people in their living environment, through the use of various embedded sensors
[56]. Some generic categories of technologies are these of ICT implants, the use of
smartphones, and that of wearable digital media (e.g., cameras, microphones, etc.).
Application areas: The application areas of ubiquitous surveillance and computing
devices are numerous since they are applicable almost everywhere, i.e., applicable
[4]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data retention
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to any type of objects (e.g., clothing), on people, and even in places [57]. Interesting
application areas of ubiquitous surveillance could be data recording (e.g., used to
augment human memory through passive recording of images), localisation/tracking
of people (in collaboration with location tracking technologies), identification of peo-
ple (in collaboration with biometric technologies), or even the provision of personal
protection services in combination with other technologies.
Challenges: One of the biggest issues with regards to ubiquitous surveillance and
computing is privacy. This is mainly the result of the seamless integration and
pervasiveness of ubiquitous technologies in almost all types of environment [58],
and because they may potentially lead to or are prone to information leakage [59].
Comparative Evaluation of Technologies
In this section, we provide a comparative evaluation of the examined type of identi-
fied technologies based on six metrics, viz. security, privacy, usability, effectiveness,
cost, and cost effectiveness. The defined metrics are examined using a qualitative
scale (see Appendix B). Specifically, we examined the above metrics in the following
context:
Security – Provides an average perception of the efficiency of a technology to
detect security violations.
Privacy – Provides an average perception of the level of privacy infringement
imposed by a security technology, and the examination of the concept of privacy-
by-design (as examined in [23]). Nevertheless, the evaluation of both properties is
not a straightforward process and is based on the experience and the perception of
the evaluator, e.g., researchers and operators. Higher values result in higher privacy
infringement.
Usability – Provides an average perception of the level of simplicity, ease of use,
and learnability of a security technology. Higher values are interpreted as being
easier to use and/or learn how to operate a particular type of technology.
Effectiveness – Provides an average perception of the level of completeness and
accuracy with which the technology achieves specific goals.
Cost – Provides an average perception of various financial costs of a security
technology. This might include the cost of purchasing a device, operating costs,
personnel cost, etc. Calculating cost is considered to be a challenging process and
can be estimated on an hourly basis (e.g., average costs of various location tracking
methods [60]). In order to cope with the cost of security technologies, we express it
on the basis of a qualitative scale (see Appendix B).
Cost effectiveness – Represents the relative cost and effectiveness of security tech-
nologies. More information with regard to evaluating cost effectiveness is provided
in Appendix B.
The data used for the analysis was based on the perception of experts operating
in five different organisations, three of them directly involved and two indirectly
involved in operating critical infrastructures; they provided their perception of each
of the technologies present in their infrastructure. Our approach uses a basic qual-
itative research analysis. Such approach suits research problems characterised by
the following: the sample size of data can be relatively small, and the interpretation
of data can be based on data that reflect experts’ perspective. To collect data, peo-
ple in utility networks completed a table of security technologies. Specifically, they
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were asked to provide their opinion on the level of security, privacy, etc., provided
by each of the security technologies present in their infrastructure.
In Table 3, we provide the type of technologies that have been identified to be
present in the water utility, electrical energy supplier, and the refinery. This infor-
mation contributes to understand how security technologies are used per critical
infrastructure. Some notable findings are that behavioural and multimodal tech-
nologies under biometrics, UAVs under visual surveillance and scene analysis tech-
niques under location tracking are not used in the examined infrastructures. On
the contrary, video technologies under visual surveillance and cyber security tech-
nologies under communication surveillance appear to be present in all three critical
infrastructures. Likewise, several types of sensors are used in each infrastructure to
monitor processes. Detailed information about the actual applied techniques and
type of sensors is omitted due to privacy concerns.
Evaluation information is depicted in Table 4, indicating types of security tech-
nologies and the relative importance of metrics according to operators’ subjective
perception. More information on the results presented in Table 4 is provided in
Appendix C.
When examining security, the analysis of data indicates three classes of security,
i.e., technologies that can offer a high level of security, such as biometrics and
location tracking; technologies that offer a medium level of security, such as visual
surveillance, communication surveillance and dataveillance; and technologies that
offer a lower level of security when compared to the rest of technologies, such as
ubiquitous surveillance.
A similar pattern to security appears to be followed also by privacy infringement.
Specifically, based on the perception of experts, location tracking is identified as
the type that imposes the highest level of privacy infringement. The lowest value is
imposed by ubiquitous and dataveillance technologies, while the rest of the examined
areas are evaluated to introduce approximately the same medium-level of privacy
infringement.
The level of usability appears to be equally for biometric and location tracking
technologies. Visual and communication surveillance follow in the second and third
positions, respectively, and dataveillance performs slightly better than ubiquitous
surveillance, which provides the lowest usability level when compared with the rest
of technologies (see Appendix C for detailed values).
Concerning effectiveness, biometrics and dataveillance appear to be the most ef-
fective type of security technology, while ubiquitous surveillance the least effective.
The majority of the rest of the examined security technologies provide a more or
less equal level of effectiveness. With regard to cost estimation, location tracking
and dataveillance are the most expensive, while ubiquitous appears to be the least
expensive form of security technology. The combined examination of cost and effec-
tiveness of security technologies provides us with the potential to examine their cost
effectiveness. Specifically, we see that biometrics appear to be most cost effective;
ubiquitous surveillance is perceived as the least cost effective, while the remaining
examined security technologies are equally cost effective.
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Table 3 Surveillance and security technologies per examined critical infrastructure.
Type Technologies Water utility Electricity utility Refinery
Visual surv. Video X X X
Imaging X X
Photography X
Biometrics Physiological X X
Communication surv. Cyber security X X X
Physical X X X
Location tracking Proximity sensing X
Triangulation X X
Dataveillance Cyber surv. X X X
Data analysis X X
Ubiquitous surv. Embedded sensors X X
Table 4 Evaluation of surveillance and security technologies based on operators’ subjective
perception.
Security Privacy Usability Effectiveness Cost Cost
effectiveness
Visual surveillance Medium Medium Medium Low Low Low
Biometrics High Medium Medium Medium Low Medium
Communication surv. Medium Medium Medium Low Low Low
Location tracking High High Medium Low Medium Low
Dataveillance Medium Low Low Medium Medium Low
Ubiquitous surv. Very low Low Low Very low Very low Very low
Very high: value > 0.8, High: 0.8 ≤ value < 0.6, Medium: 0.6 ≤ value < 0.4,
Low: 0.4 ≤ value < 0.2, Very low: value ≤ 0.2 (see Appendix C for values)
Discussion, Related Research, and Conclusion
A first step in our analysis was to identify the major surveillance and security
technologies and to categorise them. The categorisation we applied was based on
the collection of information from several research works, and this resulted in the
definition of six main types (see Table 1). The definition of the main technology
types served as the basis of identifying some of the emerging technologies used per
se. We note that the list of technologies in each type could be more extensive.
It is interesting that the metrics we defined for performing the analysis of tech-
nologies in this survey were not extensively covered by previous research. In this
paper, we include and define security based on the perception of the authors; we
see this as extremely important. By contrast, privacy clearly emerges from the ex-
amined studies as the most important issue in the security landscape. Privacy was
examined in several of the primary studies and under various contexts and was also
identified as one of the most important future challenges in security.
With regard to the set of defined metrics (see Table 4) – some of them have been
examined in similar analyses of surveillance and security technologies. However, to
the best of our knowledge, an analysis of these metrics in the context of critical in-
frastructures was missing. Specifically, we anticipate that our analysis can provide
practical information and indications about the level of security, privacy, usability
and cost effectiveness provided by security technologies in utility networks. More-
over, to cope with potential controversy on the evaluation of the examined metrics,
we argue that their evaluation based on a qualitative scale and incorporation of the
‘confidence’ metric during the collection of data have greatly amplified the comple-
tion of this task in an efficient way (see Appendix B).
To the best of our knowledge, the addressed research works appear to be the most
relevant sources of information with regards to surveillance and security technolo-
gies. However, none of this representative literature appears to examine them in
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the context of critical infrastructures. Additionally, apart from the research work
conducted in [24] (which is restricted to a subset of technologies related to crime
investigation), none of the rest referred to the evaluation of security, privacy in-
fringement, usability, effectiveness, cost, and cost effectiveness. And none of the
existing surveys included an evaluation of technologies based on the perception of
experts. Specifically, the evaluation of surveillance and security technologies in the
context of critical infrastructures and identification of biometrics as one of the most
cost-effective technologies motivated us to further investigate the application of mo-
bile identification checking devices with support of facial and fingertip recognition
in an industrial environment [61], where following a game theoretic decision making
framework we defined optimum patrol strategies [62].
The implementation of an ‘open surveillance’ system is an important step in
realising a resilience strategy and framework for protecting critical infrastructures
[9, 12]. The resulting ‘open resilience’ system will provide monitoring of the extended
perimeter of multi-stakeholder cyber physical systems, and thus prompt detection
when an adverse event or condition occurs.
Other critical infrastructures – such as Smart Grids – are evolving into com-
plex cyber-physical systems, and therefore, ensuring their protection is considered
to be a multi-variable problem. Socio-technical systems can be defined as multi-
stakeholder cyber physical systems, with the latter being comprised of physical
and computational resources. Surveillance can support the situational awareness in
such large-scale systems through the provision of multidimensional data required
to build an integrated picture of the current and future system’s states. Hence, an
efficient surveillance solution constructed by deployment of appropriate sensor and
monitoring technologies will definitely improve the ability of complex power sys-
tems to detect anomalous situations and to react in a timely manner. Surveillance
and security technologies are examined extensively in existing literature, but not
explicitly in the context of power systems and other critical infrastructures. This
motivated us to explore the main technologies applicable in critical infrastructures
and to present an evaluation of them based on the perceived opinion of experts.
We anticipate that the information we presented will serve as a useful insight for
designers, implementers and deployers of new innovative protection systems in fu-
ture, as well as facilitating interactions amongst the relevant communities. Because
of the rapid introduction and use of cyber-physical systems, these communities will
involve ICT (information and communication technologies), cyber-security, and the
emerging field of resilient systems. However, it is noteworthy that despite the sev-
eral (technical) advancements in technologies, non-technical risk metrics in critical
infrastructures are currently underemphasised. Future work using surveillance and
security technologies for protecting critical infrastructures should be a comprehen-
sive approach that introduces monitoring processes in each of the technical layers
of these systems (for example the Purdue layers; see [63] or the European Smart
Grid Architecture Model (SGAM); see [64]). We also recommend further research
on organisational processes, procedures, and peoples’ behaviour (see Organisation,
Technology, Individual (OTI) viewpoints in [65]), and on monitoring and increasing
the resilience of critical infrastructures against cyber-physical threats [66, 67, 68, 69].
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Appendix A
A systematic literature review of surveillance technologies was conducted in this paper to identify and analyse
various individual projects and prior research work. This review was designed to provide a wide overview of a
research area, to classify information and provide comparative information. We decided to perform this type of
review since our goal is to overview state-of-the-art technological trends and best practices in the surveillance area.
Specifically, in order to accomplish this objective, we conduct a systematic review similar to that in [70].
Research questions
The specification of a set of questions to be answered is considered to be extremely important to be able to conduct
a systematic review. Therefore, we have created two different sets of question categories, viz. general questions
(GQ), and focused questions (FQ). In Table 5, we list the set of defined research questions per category. The set of
general questions is concerned with the identification of general trends of surveillance technologies. This type of
questions will help to perform a landscaping with regard to current surveillance technologies. GQ1 is concerned with
the type of surveillance technologies that are examined or proposed. This will result in extracting adequate
information about the different technologies used. GQ2 identifies which surveillance technologies are used in a
certain kind of surveillance area. This might be an important factor since it may lead to identify which technologies
are best suited for application in utility networks. Lastly, GQ3 questions the challenges of enforcing the identified
surveillance technologies. This will eventually unveil the main issues that the majority of surveillance technologies
encounter and provide thoughts for future consideration.
Focused questions address the classification of surveillance technologies in several dimensions, here security, privacy,
and usability. FQ1 focuses on technologies that are capable of improving the security in various areas. FQ2
concentrates on the level of privacy infringement imposed by the application of any type of surveillance
technologies. Additionally, ways of protecting the privacy of people are also examined. Finally, FQ3 explores the
usability of the identified technologies within certain areas.
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Search Strategy
Finding a complete set of primary studies is the next step. As stated in [71], these studies should have a relation
with the research questions, and also ensure that are not biased. This would require following a search strategy,
which may include the construction of an appropriate set of keywords, which will eventually define the scope of the
search strategy.
Construction of search keywords
In order to achieve an accurate search result, it is required to perform a search using an appropriate combination of
keywords, which are strongly related to the topic under research. To frame research questions a set of criteria can be
used. These criteria can lead to the refinement and optimisation of the group of keywords, and thus, provide guides
for the selection of primary studies. Some of these criteria consist of population, intervention, comparison, outcome
and context [72]. Specifically, we are mostly interested in populations and intervention. This is because, as stated in
[71], ’populations’ may involve terms related to standards and technologies, while ’intervention’ addresses specific
issues in technologies. Conducting search questions using individual surveillance controls, e.g., camera, sensors, etc.,
does not result in retrieving the desired outcome. Therefore, in order to restrict the results, we defined
context-based search keywords. We consider as context the keyword ’surveillance’. Again, this has to further be
refined by a population keyword. Therefore, we set ’technologies’ as our population keyword. Hence, the final
keyword set is: surveillance AND technologies, with AND being the usual Boolean operator.
Sources of information
The literature review was carried out on manuscripts that were obtained from several on-line electronic databases,
and by performing search queries using our defined keyword set. To cover the majority of existing information,
information retrieval was conducted using eight different on-line databases. Table 6 lists the set of selected
electronic libraries. The selected databases are known to cover the most relevant journals, conference and workshop
publications within the area of computing and engineering. The initial search resulted in 862 potentially relevant
papers on surveillance technologies.
The initial set of documents was filtered in order to exclude irrelevant studies from our survey, and thus, to include
the most representative studies for that. The process of identifying the primary studies included an initial filtration
of the gathered information by title. This included looking, once again, for representative keywords, as stated before.
The second step resulted in 150 studies (i.e., reduced by 82.59%), which were further collated, to exclude
duplicates, and examined for their on-line availability. The latter process resulted in 116 documents (i.e., reduced by
22.66%). The next step included the filtering of the studies based on the information included in their abstract.
Documents not referring to surveillance systems (e.g., surveillance of medical deceases) were excluded, and thus,
resulting in 60 individual studies (i.e., reduced by 48.27%). The final step included the reading of the full paper, and
exclusion of these that did not provide adequate information with regard to the defined research questions. This last
step led to the identification of 16 documents (i.e., reduced by 73.33%) that represented the main source of
information for the overview study of surveillance technologies.
In Table 7, we list the studies that have been identified through the previous data gathering process. Specifically, we
assign an identification code (ID) to each study document in column one (S1 – S15); we refer to the researchers that
performed the primary study in column two; and finally, we provide the title of the study document in column three.
Table 5 Research questions.
Reference Question
General questions
GQ1 Which surveillance technologies are proposed or examined?
GQ2 What application areas are proposed or examined for surveillance technolo-
gies?
GQ3 What are the challenges in surveillance technologies?
Focused Questions
FQ1 Which technologies are able to improve the level of security offered by surveil-
lance technologies?
FQ2 Which privacy implications of surveillance technologies are examined?
FQ3 Which technologies are examined to improve the usability of surveillance tech-
nologies within certain areas?
Table 6 Selected electronic databases.
Electronic database Website
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Table 7 List of primary studies.
ID Primary study Title
S1 [Gulijk et al., 2012] Survey of surveillance technologies, including
their specific identification for further work
S2 [Bellanova & Friedewald, 2011] Smart Surveillance – State of the Art
S3 [Guelke et al., 2013] Matrix of Surveillance Technologies
S4 [Schlehahn et al., 2013] Report on surveillance technology and pri-
vacy enhancing design
S5 [Nguyen et al., 2009] Encountering SenseCam: Personal Recording
Technologies in Everyday Life
S6 [Weber, 2006] The Next Step: Privacy Invasions by Biomet-
rics and ICT Implants
S7 [Thalmann, Salamin, Ott, Gutie´rrez, &
Vexo, 2006]
Advanced Mixed Reality Technologies for
Surveillance and Risk Prevention Applica-
tions
S8 [Hampapur et al., 2003] Smart Surveillance: Applications, Technolo-
gies and Implications
S9 [Williams & Eyo] Ubiquitous Computing: The Technology for
Boundless Surveillance
S10 [Mueller & Kuehn, 2013] Einstein on the Breach: Surveillance Tech-
nology, Cybersecurity and Organizational
Change
S11 [Sutor & Reda, 2008] Multi Sensor Technologies Augmenting
Video Surveillance: Security and Data Fusion
Aspects
S12 [Senior, 2009] An Introduction to Automatic Video Surveil-
lance
S13 [Meggitt, Roderick, & Cooke, 1999] Advanced Technologies for Undersea Surveil-
lance of Modern Threats
S14 [Gulzar, Abbasi, Wu, Ozbal, & Yan, 2013] Surveillance Privacy Protection
S15 [Gong, Loy, & Xiang, 2011] Security and Surveillance
Quality assessment
Since the assessment of primary studies is critical, we adopted a set of quality criteria, as defined in [71], to perform
an appropriate assessment. In particular, these criteria are expressed with the following list of quality assessment
(QA) questions:
QA1: Is there a clear statement about the aim of the research?
QA2: Is there an adequate description of the research context?
QA3: Is there a review about related work of problem?
QA4: Is the conclusion related to the aim and purpose of research defined?
QA5: Is there a clear statement of findings?
QA6: Does the study recommend further research?
Table 8 depicts the result of our analysis after applying the defined set of quality assessment criteria to the list of
identified primary studies. This indicated that not all of our defined criteria are achieved by all primary studies;
however, we have decided not to eliminate them since not being able to fulfil all the criteria in this study does not
affect the extraction of required information. Specifically, we use the ’X’ symbol (i.e., ‘yes’) to indicate that a study
fulfils a criterion and left as blank (meaning ‘no’) to indicate non-fulfilment of one of the criteria.
Table 8 Quality assessment for primary studies.
Primary QA1 QA2 QA3 QA4 QA5 QA6
study
S1 X X X
S2 X X X X
S3 X X X
S4 X X X X
S5 X X X X X X
S6 X X
S7 X X X X
S8 X X X X X
S9 X X
S10 X X X X
S11 X X X
S12 X X X
S13 X X X X
S14 X X X X
S15 X X X X X
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Data extraction
With regard to data extraction, this was done on the basis of the collected study documents. Specifically, in Table 9,
we illustrate the source of information for each of the defined type of questions (i.e., generic and focused).
Table 9 Data extraction from primary studies.
Primary GQ1 GQ2 GQ3 FQ1 FQ2 FQ3
study
S1 X X
S2 X X X X X
S3 X X X X
S4 X X X
S5 X X X
S6 X X X
S7 X X
S8 X X X X X
S9 X X X
S10 X X X X
S11 X X X X
S12 X X
S13 X X X
S14 X X X
S15 X X X X
Appendix B
Experts operating in utility networks provided the data for evaluating the metrics. In all cases, the level of
confidence with regard to the given information is taken into consideration. In more detail, we performed a mapping
of qualitative values to quantitative ones, which we have developed and applied in [73].
The applied mappings are provided in the following:
• Confidence = {(high = 1), (medium = 0.5), (low = 0.1)}.
• Security = {(excellent = 1), (very good = 0.8), (good = 0.6), (fair = 0.4), (poor = 0.2)}.
• Privacy = {(excellent = 1), (very good = 0.8), (good = 0.6), (fair = 0.4), (poor = 0.2)}.
• Usability = {(excellent = 1), (very good = 0.8), (good = 0.6), (fair = 0.4), (poor = 0.2)}.
• Effectiveness = {(excellent = 1), (very good = 0.8), (good = 0.6), (fair = 0.4), (poor = 0.2)}.
• Cost = {(extremely expensive = 1), (very expensive = 0.8), (expensive = 0.6), (moderate = 0.4), (cheap
= 0.2)}.
Based on these sets, the formula used for calculating the cost-effectiveness of a security technology (ST) is:
Cost EffectivenessST = EffectivenessST × (1–CostST ) (1)
In formula 1 it is required to calculate the frequency of variables values (i.e., obtains count on a single variable’s
values) to compute average effectiveness (i.e., EffectivenessST ). This is expressed in the range of [0, 1].
Likewise, we calculate the average cost of a technology. Since the cost of each technology is considered to be
inversely proportional to its overall cost effectiveness, we subtract CostST from 1 (all values are expressed in the
range of [0, 1]). Following, we use VP to refer to ‘Valid Percentage’, i.e., a percentage that does not include missing
cases. Specifically, we have that:
VPvalue = (ValueOccurrences)/(Totalnumberofvalues),VPvalue ∈ [0 , 1 ] (2)
Additionally, it holds that:
ConfidenceST = (1 × VPhigh + 0 .5 × VPmedium + 0 .1 × VPlow ) (3)
EffectivenessST = ConfidenceST × (1 × VPexcellent + 0 .8 × VPverygood+
0 .6 × VPgood + 0 .4 × VPfair + 0 .2 × VPpoor )
(4)
And,
CostST = ConfidenceST × (1 × VPextremelyexpensive + 0 .8 × VPveryexpensive+
0 .6 × VPexpensive + 0 .4 × VPmoderate + 0 .2 × VPcheap)
(5)
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Appendix C
The information in Table 10 provides detailed information about the computed values on experts’ perception, i.e.,
before and after applying confidence to experts’ opinion.
Table 10 Perception of experts in utility networks.
Security Privacy Usability Effectiveness Cost Confidence
Visual Calculated value (Cv.) 0.7000 0.6667 0.6333 0.4667 0.3333 0.8333
surveillance Cv. * Confidence 0.5833 0.5556 0.5278 0.3889 0.2778
Cost Effectiveness 0.2809
Biometrics Calculated value (Cv.) 0.7000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.3000 1.0000
Cv. * Confidence 0.7000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.3000
Cost Effectiveness 0.4200
Communication Calculated value (Cv.) 0.5500 0.4750 0.6000 0.4250 0.4500 0.8750
surveillance Cv. * Confidence 0.4813 0.4156 0.5250 0.3719 0.3938
Cost Effectiveness 0.2254
Location Calculated value (Cv.) 0.7000 0.7500 0.6000 0.4000 0.4500 1.0000
tracking Cv. * Confidence 0.7000 0.7500 0.6000 0.4000 0.4500
Cost Effectiveness 0.2200
Dataveillance Calculated value (Cv.) 0.5778 0.5111 0.5111 0.5333 0.5333 0.7778
Cv. * Confidence 0.4494 0.3975 0.3975 0.4148 0.4148
Cost Effectiveness 0.2427
Ubiquitous Calculated value (Cv.) 0.4500 0.6000 0.5500 0.5000 0.3000 0.4000
surveillance Cv. * Confidence 0.1800 0.2400 0.2200 0.2000 0.1200
Cost Effectiveness 0.1760
